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I. Introduction

Negotiation has often been seen as a cumulative process, where smaller steps lead to
greater ones as discussions move forward. However, some failures of the peace process in the
Donbas war lead towards the challenging of this assumption. This paper identifies a number of
factors which have become barriers to ongoing mediation by the Organization for Stability and
Co-operation in Europe in the Trilateral Contact Group and the leaders of France and Germany
in the Normandy Format and hopes to present them in an original manner, pointing towards
greater implications for challenges faced by this process and the difficulty of resolving gray zone
conflicts. The paper then recommends a direction for future research to dig deeper into many of
these ideas.
This paper assumes some base knowledge of the situations which triggered the Donbas
conflict and the creation of the Trilateral Contact Group (consisting of representatives of
Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk separatists, and the OSCE) and later the Normandy Format
(consisting of the leaders of Ukraine, Russian, France, and Germany) to mediate the conflict.
Due to time constraint, a fully summary of these events could not be provided.
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II. Review of Mediation Theory

Mediation, as a tool for international conflict resolution, has been studied by a number of
past authors and scholars of international relations. Though many concepts surrounding the
factors that influence mediation success are generally agreed upon, there are some distinct
exceptions where debate continues. Before moving on to the main arguments made by scholars
explaining why mediation has failed to end the Donbas conflict, this section will briefly explore
some of the key concepts surrounding mediation and its effectiveness as a tool for the
negotiation process.

Defining Mediation
Synthesizing a number of existing definitions, this paper defines mediation as a form of
intervention in which a third party, voluntarily and mutually accepted by the parties of a conflict,
assists in guiding the ongoing conflict in the direction of a peaceful negotiated settlement in a
non-violent manner and without enforcement ability over agreed-upon outcomes. However, it is
critical to understand the complexities overlooked in a somewhat vague definition. In practice,
mediation varies greatly in the interactions between the mediator, including their traits and
resources, and the actors of a conflict, with their own contextual traits. The role of mediator can
even change partway through conflict – as can many contextual variables of the conflict itself.1
Mediation is meant to be moldable and is often conducted behind closed doors, so scholars often

Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., “Mediation and Conflict Resolution,” in The
SAGE handbook of conflict resolution, (Sage, 2008), 342-43.
1
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cannot identify every detail of the strategies employed.2 However, there remain a number of
unifying factors, and the main goal of this definition is to distinguish the practice of mediation
from other similar strategies of conflict resolution.

Context Variables that Influence the Process and Outcomes of Mediation
Mediation efforts are defined by a number of context variables, which impact both the
type of mediation strategy that must be chosen as well as the final outcome and effectiveness of
the mediation. Jacob Bercovitch described mediation as consisting of four elements: (1) the
parties; (2) the issues or the nature of the dispute; (3) the mediator; and (4) the context.3 There
exist other frameworks of looking at these variables, but these frameworks tend to still agree on
which factors are important to mediation. The impact of each of these elements seems generally
accepted, though the individual impacts of characteristics of each of these factors on mediation
outcome is up for debate.
Though this paper will not go into every single factor in the depth that it deserves, it will
focus on the factors (especially those relating to mediator characteristics) that most correlate to
the later analysis.

Nature of the Mediator
The nature of a mediator in many ways defines the effectiveness of the mediated
negotiation process. Third-party mediators can be independent individuals or representatives of
organizations or states, and their position relative to the conflicting parties may influence how a

Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., “Mediation and Conflict Resolution,” in The
SAGE handbook of conflict resolution, (Sage, 2008), 341.
3
Jacob Bercovitch, and Richard Jackson, Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-first Century: Principles, Methods, and
Approaches, University of Michigan Press, 2009, 35.
2
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successful mediation must be carried out. Mediation by individuals – those not representing state
or non-state organization – varies quite a bit depending on who the mediator is, what resources
they have at their disposal, the formality of their involvement, etc.4 Mediation by organizations
can be categorized by different types of organization: regional, international, and transnational.
Regional and international organizations – intergovernmental organizations – are made up of
states and are often called to mediate issues of their members, generally trying to do so with
impartiality. Meanwhile, transnational organizations – non-governmental organizations – are
made up of individuals with some common interest. What is common between these different
types of organizations is a general lack of the necessary resources for successful mediation.5
Mediation by states is the most commonly seen form. States also vary depending on their power
on the world stage and many other factors. The mediation efforts of the representatives of states
are defined by their position, leeway in deciding on policy decisions, and the resources given to
them.6 States that mediate may have other intrinsic traits that impact mediation success. It has
been seen that there is a correlation between a democratic regime and the frequency and success
rate of mediation, for example.7
There is no singular, perfect way to carry out mediation, and it is imperative that
mediators tailor the format of their efforts according to the crisis they are trying to resolve.8 One
such aspect that should vary from situation to situation is the use of leverage on the part of a
mediator. Leverage can be used as a means to bring both parties of a conflict to a perspective of

4

Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediators and Mediation Strategies in International Relations," Negotiation Journal 8, no. 2
(1992): 99-100.
5
Ibid, 102.
6
Ibid, 101-102.
7
Molly M. Melin, "When States Mediate," Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 2, no. 1 (2013): 8485.
8
Kyle Beardsley, "Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution," Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs 2, issue 1 (2013): 58.
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mutually hurting stalemate, in which they then see a negotiated settlement as a better option to
continued fighting. A mutually hurting stalemate is defined as a point in the conflict where both
parties perceive that they have suffered noticeable losses and that the status quo will not yield a
better situation for them.9 Leverage is used by mediators to cultivate a ripe situation for conflict
resolution, presenting “sticks or carrots” to make a negotiated settlement preferrable to either
party’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement. Examples of this could be threat of military
intervention or economic sanctions or the promise of aid. Leverage is often the best solution to
resolving commitment issues that may arise during a negotiation process when its incentives are
used to hold the actors to their agreement. However, leverage is not something a mediator can
always credibly provide, and it needs to be tailored to the situation it is being used in. It has also
been argued that an over-use of leverage may be detrimental to the natural progression of the
peace process – creating artificial resolutions that do not have the same lasting strength without
the presence of the third party.10 Such concerns have brought forward one perspective that use of
leverage should be reserved for situations in which the immediate loss of human life is a risk.11
Mediator rank is another factor that can have an influence on the respect involved parties
will view their mediator with. The importance of rank is true not just for the individual carrying
out the mediation but also the rank of the state and its position in regards to the other actors in
the conflict, if the mediation is being carried out by a state actor. As keenly described by Jacob
Bercovitch: “High ranking mediators, because of their legitimacy and resources, are more likely
to balance power discrepancies, enhance cooperative behavior, and facilitate a settlement."12 If

9

I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond," in International conflict resolution after the
Cold War, National Research Council, 2000, 228-232.
10
Kyle Beardsley, "Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution," Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs 2, issue 1 (2013): 60.
11
Ibid, 60-61.
12
Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “Influence of Mediator Characteristics and Behavior on the success of
Mediation in International Relations,” The International Journal of Conflict Management 4, no. 4 (1993): 301.
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the individual carrying out the mediation is not of a similar rank to the representatives of the
conflicting parties, the mediator’s statements may not hold the same respect as a seemingly more
legitimate mediator’s might. The differing level of resources a mediator of one rank might hold
is also very relevant for giving credibility to the application of leverage.
One natural assumption is that a mediator should be neutral towards the conflict in order
to best encourage a strong peace agreement. Some definitions of mediation go as far as
specifying that a mediator must be non-biased. However, there has been significant research
arguing that biased mediators can be used as a valuable tool for the peace process.13 They can
encourage both sides to lower their expectations on where the negotiations will settle, since
parties might not see their positions as achievable through biased mediation. Bias provides a
mediator with a certain degree of leverage over the mediator that they are perceived as being
biased towards – making their propositions to this actor more credible.14 It may also be the case
that the most valuable aspect is due to the assumptions that parties may make in perceiving their
mediator as biased one way or another, leading even the less-supported actor towards accepting a
mediator as credible.15 When it comes to the long-term durability of peace brought about by
mediation, some research shows that biased mediation proves more successful.16 Then again, not
all scholars with this point on the effectiveness of bias, highlighting the dangers of parties not
wanting to involve themselves in biased conflict resolution efforts and the fact that bias goes
against many of the international ideals that developed conflict resolution concepts in the first

Isak Svensson, “Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications,” Journal of Law & International Affairs 2
no. 1 (2013): 17-26.
14
I. William Zartman, “Introduction: Bias, Prenegotiation and Leverage in Mediation,” International Negotiation,
13, no. 3 (2008): 306.
15
Saadia Touval, and William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985), 256-257.
16
Isak Svensson, "Who Brings Which Peace? Neutral versus Biased Mediation and Institutional Peace
Arrangements in Civil Wars," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (2009): 446-469.
13
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place.17 Though scholars disagree in this regard, the impact of mediator bias is visible in a
number of differing cases.
Yet another variable which is worth considering is the personal traits of individuals and
leaders involved in mediation. This paper will not go into great depth in this subject, and many
scholars that lean more towards neo-realism do not see this as an important factor, but a newly
developing body of research argues that specific individuals are simply better at carrying out
mediation for one reason or another relating to their character and/or expertise.18

Nature of the Involved Parties
The power dynamics of the conflicting parties are particularly important, because they
define the balance of power in the conflict and thus the direction negotiations are likely able to
go when keeping in mind different parties’ best alternatives to a negotiated agreement.
The characteristics of the parties and their similarities/differences will also shape how a
mediation can take place. Political norms, culture, economic situation, social structures, religion,
language all play a role in the perspective an actor will have towards resolution to the conflict.
This can be relevant in many ways. For example, countries may be challenged to come to an
agreeable settlement if they are founded on differing justice systems and principles.19 Because
cultural factors vary a lot, the full spectrum of impacts these factors can have is very wide.

Scott S Gartner, “Third-Party Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Actors, Strategies, Selection, and Bias,” Volume 6
Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation (2014): 278.
18
Joshua Paul Galliano, "The role of personal characteristics in international mediations," LSU Master's Theses
(2002): 1127-.
19
John S. Odell and Dustin Tingley, "Negotiating Agreements in International Relations," in Negotiating
Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics, 144-182, Edited by Jane
Mansbridge and Cathie Jo Martin, American Political Science Association, Dec. 2013: 174.
17
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The previous relationship and history of the involved parties plays a role both in their
current perspectives towards each other as well as their ability to negotiate. When actors are able
to understand how each other thinks, negotiations naturally play out differently than if there is
less common logic to identify.
As already mentioned, mediation strategies should vary depending on the type of actors
involved in the conflict. When mediation occurs in an intrastate conflict, there is also the
challenge of recognizing rebel groups and non-state actors in negotiations. Simply by doing so
they gain a certain degree of legitimacy which may be their main goal from the conflict – making
compromise more difficult.20 In such cases, the implications of mediation can be both positive
and negative.

Nature of the Conflict and Context of mediation
These is no single, objectively best form of mediation, and the type of mediation a thirdparty actor may choose to conduct is influenced greatly by a number of factors in the conflict
into which they are intervening. Whether a conflict is interstate, intrastate, or some hybrid (as we
will see the case is with the Donbas war), mediation must be tailored to fit the conflict.
Conflicts of differing intensity will require different responses. The sides of a conflict
will have more anger towards each other with the more damage they take from fighting. Higher
levels of intervention may be needed by the mediator with a conflict of greater intensity.
However, it has been argued that higher levels of conflict intensity mean a lower likelihood of
mediation success.21

20

Kyle Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 162.
Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International
Mediation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 4 (1993): 675.
21
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The timing of an intervention may also be a factor – on top of the inherent voluntary
acceptance of the mediation in the first place. The duration of the conflict at the moment of
intervention is a variable that is likely to impact mediation success. There is, however, debate
over whether earlier intervention – when positions may still be mailable before full escalation of
the conflict – is more successful than later intervention – when the cost of the conflict becomes
more visible and continued fighting is already less preferable than negotiation.22
The issues at stake in a conflict may also define how a conflict must be mediated. It has
been identified that when the issues involve territory and national security are present, mediation
is less likely to be successful.23 The difference between tangible and intangible issues is also
worth specifying in research.24 Complexity of issues at stake is also another factor that needs to
be considered, as differing levels of complexity will allow for different amounts of flexibility in
mediation efforts.
There is also the mediation environment – the diplomatic frame of goals that a mediator
inserts themselves into. Established norms of mediator repeated over time can also develop a
distinct mediation environment. Information from past mediators will impact how future
mediation is carried out.25 In general, mediation is seen as a cumulative process where each step
forward can lead to greater success in future negotiation.
There are other perspectives of analyzing these contextual variables – such as looking at
the pre-existing conflict context, concurrent mediation context, and background mediation

22

Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International
Mediation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 4 (1993): 676.
23
Marvin Ott, “Mediation as a Method of Conflict Resolution: Two Cases,” International Organization, 26, no. 4,
(1972): 595-618.
24
Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Langley, "The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International
Mediation," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 4 (1993): 676-77.
25
Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, "Why do they do it like this? An analysis of the factors influencing
mediation behavior in international conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000): 183.

10

context – according to their impact on mediation behavior decisions, rather than simply on the
final mediation outcome.26 Though this is a valuable perspective for understanding the process of
how mediation is conducted and how mediators must adapt to the situation to which they are
presented, this particular study will maintain its focus on mediation effectiveness and what
factors get in the way of successful resolution to a mediated conflict.

The Practice of Mediation
A large part of what differentiates successful mediation from unsuccessful mediation is
how a mediator can take the provided context of their mediation and mold a fitting process to it.
Sometimes the resources, timing, and opportunities do not fit together, but other times they do.
There is a large amount of research analyzing specific cases of mediation in datasets to identify
which outcomes are likely.

When Does Mediation Occur?
Due to the voluntary nature of mediation, motivation is a key element both for the
mediator and the consenting parties of the conflict. When is mediation chosen over other
options? The truth is that motivation for the actors varies from mediator to mediator, but because
mediation efforts are costly for governments to involve themselves in, it is hard to see a
mediation effort take place without the mediator’s own agenda playing a role.27 Individuals may
see benefit in mediation for their own gain from a political situation, for example. They could
also use it as an opportunity to proliferate their own values and ideas. Meanwhile, representatives

26

Ibid. 170-202.
Saadia Touval, and William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985), 8.
27
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of a state or international organization may see it as their responsibility to intervene or that not
intervening in some way would put their region of interest at risk.28 Parties in the conflict will be
motivated to seek out mediation when their own attempts at ending a conflict have failed and yet
they don’t see the status quo as a preferrable option. They may see a mediator as a possible route
to successful negotiated settlement or as simply a tool to represent their commitment to seeking
out other options. They may also think of a mediator as someone to blame for failures in
negotiation. This is a way that mediation allows parties to save face amid negotiations.29 It is also
importantly the role of mediators to oftentimes give more legitimacy to agreements and allow the
parties to trust one another.30 Civil wars represent a potentially risky situation for state actors
accepting mediation. When a mediator intervenes in a civil war to guide negotiations between
the government and non-state actors, those non-state actors are inherently given some legitimacy
by their recognition.31 Another examples would be that states are more likely to accept mediation
when the actor they face in their conflict is seen as a strategic rival.32 Many factors like this
define instances when mediation takes place due to motivated parties willing to accept mediators
into the negotiation process.

Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., “Mediation and Conflict Resolution,” in The
SAGE handbook of conflict resolution, (Sage, 2008), 345-346.
29
D. G. Pruitt and D. F. Johnson, D. F., “Mediation as an aid to face saving in negotiation,” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 14 no. 3, (1970): 239–246.
30
Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, eds., “Mediation and Conflict Resolution,” in The
SAGE handbook of conflict resolution, (Sage, 2008), 346.
31
Molly M. Melin, and Isak Svensson, "Incentives for talking: Accepting mediation in international and civil wars,"
International Interactions 35, no. 3 (2009): 249-271.
32
Molly M. Melin, "When States Mediate," Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs 2, no. 1 (2013): 87.
28
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Mediators as Actors in the Negotiation Process
When thinking of war as a bargaining interaction, as conceived by James D. Fearon,33 the
inclusion of a mediator can be defined as turning a diametric interacting into a triangular one – in
which the mediator must now take part in the bargaining process.34 This is integral when
visualizing the impact of mediators in the peace process. After all, mediators themselves likely
have a direction they want to see the conflict resolved, if they got involved in the first place.

The Mediation Process & Strategies Employed by Mediators
Mediators and the parties of a conflict must make a decision as far as how much they will
intervene in the negotiation process and how much control they will have over the proceedings.
Scholars have identified a number of ways to categorize the strategies employed by mediators.
One such classification, as devised by Touval and Zartman and often employed by Bercovitch,
splits the actions taken by mediators into three strategies: (1) communication-facilitation
strategies, (2) procedural-formulation strategies, and (3) manipulation/directive strategies.35
Communication-facilitation represents the least amount of leverage or control over the
negotiation process – focusing on getting the conflicting parties to the negotiating table,
providing neutral information, building trust, encouraging the articulation of interests, and
similar tasks. Procedural-formulation builds past that, giving the mediator a more organizational
role of determining meeting details as well as establishing and maintaining the environment in
which mediation will take place – focusing on keeping the negotiation process moving.

33

James D. Fearon, "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-414.
Saadia Touval, and William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985), 10.
35
Saadia Touval, and William Zartman, eds., International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985), 10-13; Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediators and Mediation Strategies in International Relations,"
Negotiation Journal 8, no. 2 (1992): 103-105.
34
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Manipulation/directive strategies are when a mediator takes a new level of involvement in the
conflict, using leverage for positive incentives or deterrents to re-frame the negotiation process
and the perspectives of the parties in dispute.36 In addition to this, there has been much analysis
of when each of these strategies work and when they are chosen.

The Effectiveness of Mediation
It is important to define what we mean when we are looking for mediation “success” or
“effectiveness.” In many ways, the definition of success is not a straight-forward thing.
Bercovitch argues outcomes of conflict resolution can be defined as being both successful and
unsuccessful by different people. Furthermore, he argues that the more important factor to
identify when it comes to mediation is whether the situation has changed for the better due to
mediation efforts. Identifying change is equally challenging.37 This perspective is a valuable one,
though one could also define success of conflict management efforts like mediation by their
ability to lead a conflict to “negative peace” and possibly closer to “positive peace” as well. The
concepts of positive and negative peace were conceived by Johan Galtung and can be briefly
summarized as an absence of direct violence and an absence of indirect violence respectively.38
When asked in an interview how we can show that peace has been achieved, Galtung responded,
“You will find that the violence starts disappearing. And not only the physical violence, but also
the nasty feelings… What happens instead is that people start cooperating… There is a reason
for it, and the theory is actually quite simple. You can say hatred is a psychological preparation

Jacob Bercovitch and Su-Mi Lee, “Mediating International Conflicts: Examining the Effectiveness of Directive
Strategies,” The International Journal of Peace Studies.
37
Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation Success or Failure: A Search for the Elusive Criteria," Cardozo Journal of Conflict
Resolution 7 (2005): 301.
38
Johan Galtung, "Violence, peace, and peace research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.
36
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for violence… [Hatred becomes unnecessary when] a conflict transformation has happened, and
violence is now unlikely.”39 Even something like an absence of hatred would be difficult for
scholars to define, but a lessening of violence is generally more identifiable.
Because of the types of conflict in which mediation is employed, there may be a
misperception at the ineffectiveness of mediation as a process rather than the difficulty in any
sort of negotiation strategy when applied to certain situations.40 Some scholars have argued that
since mediation is generally employed in some of the toughest conflicts to resolve, it naturally
has a lower success rate and the implication that peace brought about by mediation may be less
durable than in other situations.41
There is also another perspective implying that mediated settlements are weaker than
their naturally negotiated counterpart. As devised by Kyle Beardsley, the “mediation dilemma”
essentially argues that mediation, due to its nature of applying temporary pressures in the
negotiation process to ensure that peace would be preferrable to an actor’s best alternative to a
negotiated agreement, oftentimes leads to peace that does not last very long after a negotiated
settlement.42 Beardsley writes that the vulnerabilities of mediation lead to a number of policy
recommendations and implications including: (1) more sparing use of mediation there is a great
potential for a costly failure, (2) awareness of legitimacy issues, (3) care in intervention when
actors in the conflict can gain something simply through the mediation and not peaceful
settlement, (4) third-parties should exercise care in intervening when coordination would prove
difficult for the implementation of a peaceful settlement, (5) the attenuation of leverage limits the

39

Ben Baruch, An Interview with Johan Galtung, Peace Insight, 2012,
https://www.peaceinsight.org/ar/articles/interview-johan-galtung/?location=sudan&theme=peace-education.
40
Scott S. Gartner, "Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to Fail but Actually Succeeds," Penn State Journal
of Law and International Affairs 2, no. 1 (2013): 27-37.
41
Scott S. Gartner and Jacob Bercovitch, "Overcoming obstacles to peace: The contribution of mediation to shortlived conflict settlements," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2006): 819-840.
42
Kyle Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
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durability of negotiated settlements, (6) low-key involvement of a single mediator can be
effective in the long-run, and concluding that (7) mediation is generally worthwhile when there
is more to gain than potential downsides.43 Though there is not the space nor context to go into
each of these points in greater depth, many of these implications will be applied to the current
mediation situation in the Donbas conflict, attempting to identify whether scholars and policymakers involved in the conflict recognize the implications as well.

43

Ibid, 183-192.
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III. Mediation in the Donbas Conflict

Efforts to fully resolve the conflict in Donbas have been going on for over six years, but
only limited successes have been achieved. There are less battlefield deaths than there were in
2015, high-caliber military weapons such as artillery have been moved from the frontline for the
most part, but breaches of the ceasefire happen regularly, and people still die due to the conflict.
In order to examine the lack of effectiveness of mediation efforts in Ukraine, scholars generally
bring forward two categories of problems: (1) challenges carried by the conflict which prevent
negotiation success and (2) issues in how mediation the negotiation process is able to be carried
out without a conclusion to the conflict.

Barriers in the Conflict
There are a number of possible factors in the conflict itself that could lead to a difficulty
in resolving it through mediation. One repeated perspective is simply that the conflict is not yet
ripe for resolution – that a mutually hurting stalemate has not been reached and that parties to not
yet perceive a reliable way out of the conflict. However, a number of scholars have still made the
argument that such a mutually hurting stalemate has been reached.44
The power dynamics of this conflict are yet another focal point of existing literature.
Russia has one of the strongest militaries on the globe, which provides it with a strong amount of
deterrence and kinetic diplomacy when it wishes to use it. However, Russia has not committed
itself to the war – making it a strange hybrid between an interstate and intrastate conflict.

Jakob Landwehr, “No Way out? Opportunities for mediation efforts in the Donbas region,” East European
Politics 35, no. 3 (July 24, 2019): 294.
44
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Not Quite a Civil War
One of the key complexities in the Donbas conflict is that it falls somewhere between an
interstate and intrastate conflict. The involvement of Russian troops in the conflict is continually
denied by the Kremlin, as there is no declared war between Russia and Ukraine, and yet Ukraine
affirms that it will not budge from its positions until Russian troops are withdrawn from Donbas.
The war is seen as a “gray zone” conflict, since details of the actors and their positions remain
hidden.45 Gray zone conflicts are especially difficult to resolve due to the higher-level tactics
employed by the involved actors in the conflict.46 As written by some scholars on the topic of the
Donbas war: “A key reason mediation has proved ineffective in gray zone crises like this is that
actors on both sides anticipate being able to use mediation to control the actions of their
opponents within reasonable limits and thus engage in hostile interactions with bearable costs.”47
One of the possible ways around this complexity is to address the conflict from a higher-level via
track-two diplomacy before moving to track-one diplomacy.48 However, many of the
complexities of wars like this are only further entangled by new and developing technologies and
ways states can interfere with each other. Because of this, there is still much to learn in how to
resolve a gray zone conflict.

David Carmen, Milana Nikolko, and Dani Belo. “Gray zone mediation in the Ukraine crisis: comparing Crimea
and Donbas.” (2019): 124.
46
Ibid, 126.
47
Ibid, 125.
48
Ibid, 139.
45
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Political Challenges
Another perspective often brought up is that Ukrainian domestic politics are getting in the
way of resolution of the conflict. In addition to Ukrainian political challenges such as corruption,
Russian political influence over the country is also a dangerous factor.49 Disinformation in the
media is a challenge very closely tied to this conflict. The Ukrainian populace is still split on
how they want to see the conflict resolved.
There are some that feel that Ukraine and Russia no longer have any common ground to
find in the negotiation process and that they have only grown more politically separated.50
However, more recent political shifts seem to show some hope. US Deputy Secretary of State
Stephen Biegun said, “Deputy Prime Minister [Reznikov] and the Zelensky administration’s
efforts have produced the most progress in six years. The strong leadership of the Ukrainian
government engaging directly with Russia makes it that much easier for the US to play an
important supporting role.”51 This message demonstrates the importance that the US recognizes
in bilateral discussion between Ukraine and Russia rather than just mediated discussion,
however.

Barriers in Negotiation
The format of the Trilateral Contact Group meant that at least initially there were rapid
successes in the mediation process, possibly due to the link to very high political levels.52

“Russia’s War in Donbas: Ripe for a Resolution? (English),” United States Institute of Peace, Oct. 19, 2020,
video, 1:16:38, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWAivgXwGDc.
50
Sabine Fischer, The Donbas Conflict: Opposing Interests and Narratives, Difficult Peace Process, (Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April, 2019), 32.
51
“Russia’s War in Donbas: Ripe for a Resolution? (English),” United States Institute of Peace, Oct. 19, 2020,
video, 1:16:38, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hWAivgXwGDc.
52
Christian Schläpfer, “Ukraine Crisis and Mediation: Not Business as Usual,” Security and Human Rights 27, (Sep.
2016): 334-336.
49
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However, the actions of OSCE mediation and these high-level formats only fulfilled the conflict
management portion of the peace process, and new actions need to be taken to move further
along53
Though not initially carried out by mediators of the conflict, western sanctions against
Russia have since become a part of mediation leverage in enforcing Minsk II. In many ways,
Minsk II filled a hole for US foreign policy to justify their continued sanctions against Russia
and give them a purpose.54 The full impact of these sanctions is difficult to factor.55 Their effect
becomes stronger as time progresses, however the economic challenge of reintegrating Donbas
also becomes more costly as time progresses.56

Flaws in Mediation
The OSCE is identified as the main mediator of the conflict, and it is obviously very
closely tied to the European Union. Despite the importance of the OSCE in managing the
conflict, the key decisions for the Minsk Agreements were not made through the Trilateral
Contact Group format under OSCE mediation but rather through the Normandy Format,57 but
even its mediating members – the leaders of France and Germany – are obviously tied to the EU.
There are some arguments that the actors involved in mediation are not fit for the job. For
example, there is criticism of the EU for focusing too much on the short-term.58 Since the EU has
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its own interests involved in the conflict, it does thereby represent a biased mediator. This bias is
perceived by Ukraine and presumably Russia, though data is less available for that perspective,
and it is not seen as helpful to negotiations.59 On the other hand, the EU has carried out a number
of actions providing leverage to ending the conflict, such as imposing economic sanctions,
applying diplomatic pressure, and taking a political stance against the armed conflict. These
actions will not bring negotiation success on their own, however.60

Flawed Agreements
Minsk II was the closest the mediation process got to an effective negotiated settlement to
end the conflict, but there is also a perspective that the points presented in this treaty are now
holding back further negotiations. Jakob Landwehr argues that in the instance when Minsk II
was signed, the best alternatives to a negotiated agreement held by the parties of the conflict
were less desirable than the agreement.61 However, not long after Minsk II was signed, this
situation shifted such that the parties no longer felt the same pressure to end the conflict, but the
points of the Minsk II agreement still continue to form the positions that the parties hold on to,
without acknowledging the oppositions interests. People have begun to call this halt of successful
negotiations “the Minsk II stalemate.” Landwehr presents the use of different leverages as a
possible road forward to shifting the conflicting actors’ best alternatives to a negotiated
agreement.62
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A number of flaws in the Minsk agreements have been identified. Many of the actions
asked for in the points of these documents are vague in their definitions of which actors should
be carrying them out – phrasing things in a bilateral way but without putting enough pressure on
the offending parties.63 This approach is especially easy on Russia, as it further contributes to
President Putin’s claims of Russian troops not being present in the Donbas region. Nothing in the
Minsk agreements directly identifies Russian military action or the responsibility of Russia to
act.64
However, there is undeniable value to the existence of the Minsk agreements, even if
many current scholars agree that their full implementation does not appear on the horizon. They
ceased the full-scale combat that was occurring on the contact line between Donbas and the rest
of Ukraine through 2014 and much of 2015. Current actors involved in the negotiations agree
that Minsk is flawed and needs to be modernized.65 The Minsk Agreements are not legal
documents and have no force over Ukraine or Russia, but many see them as a jumping point to
more legally-binding agreements.

Uncooperative Actors
Another very common perspective is that the different actors are not being fully
cooperative with the peace process. There are a number of possible commitment issues which
could be holding back the peace process. Russia is continuously blamed for uncooperative
behavior, and much of this is accurate. President Putin continues to deny the presence of Russian
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troops in Donbas and has since 2014. Because of this, Russia seems to have almost taken up a
role as another mediator in the negotiations to end the conflict rather than the position Ukraine
sees them in – their opponent. Ukraine perceives the rebels to some degree as Russian citizens
(since they were given citizenship by the Russian Federation) and thus representatives of Russian
ideas.66 Meanwhile, Ukrainian officials continue a dialogue that they will hold fast to Crimea and
not accept any bargain giving it away to Russia for a return of Donbas.67 They also continue to
frame Ukraine as completely cooperative in the negotiation process and never holding a lack of
willingness to fulfil commitments involved in the Minsk Agreements – saying that the lack of
willingness comes purely from Russia.68 This rhetoric is also very common to see in Western
news sources.

Continued Hope for Resolution
The recent COVID-19 pandemic and its implications should not be forgotten. Some have
identified it as a possible ripe moment for resolution of the conflict, but no such success has
occurred. The pandemic served as one of the greatest factors in stopping battlefield deaths
recently. The Normandy Format has continued to hold meetings virtually through this global
crisis.69
Another idea that policy-makers are grasping to is the fact that the Novorossiya
Confederation (a Russian-backed effort to create a joint government between the republics of
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Donetsk and Luhansk) was a failure, which should have implications towards Russia’s continued
intentions in Ukraine.70
Whatever resolution might be able to occur must be pragmatic for all parties. One
proposal in 2016 called the “Steinmeier Formula,” named for German Foreign Minister and
OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Frank-Walter Steinmeier who wrote it, recommends a possible
compromise of how elections could be run in the Donbas (something Russia and the rebel groups
want) while requiring a carefully managed removal of troops from the border (something
Ukraine wants).71 Though there have been moments where both parties stated their approval of
the Steinmeier Formula, none of its steps have been accomplished.

Summary of the Existing Literature
Though some of these points have been touched on, there has been much less emphasis
than there should be on the effects of mediator bias, credibility, and leverage – or a lack thereof –
on the failure of mediation efforts trying to end the Donbas conflict. Moreover, it seems that
contemporary theories are only recently coming to see the negative effects of the
interconnectedness between ongoing negotiations and those of the flawed Minsk agreements.
Much existing literature also seems to ignore the changing circumstances of the conflict
and the damage that an over-reliance on failed agreements from over five years ago have on
ongoing mediation attempts. Only more recent scholars seem to identify this as a challenge. It is
not possible to challenge Russia’s position of denying involvement in the conflict while acting as
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if they are another mediator within the Normandy Format without also challenging the Minsk
Agreements.

It is important to recognize that the majority of Western think-tanks and scholars writing
about the conflict imagine success in terms of a situation that the West would be supportive of.
There are countless examples of possible solutions to the conflict that rely on external parties
applying pressure on Russia to accept a peaceful settlement that goes against the interests of the
Kremlin. However, it is much harder to find anyone arguing for a solution which applies more
pressure on Ukraine to accept a solution that benefits Russia. This may be for the best, and yet
the fact that the existing Minsk Agreement does not apply any direct pressure to Russia in the
first place makes that perspective somewhat nonsensical.
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IV. Conclusions

Judging from the failure to implement the Steinmeier Formula, it is clear that the parties
still see something to gain from this in-between stage of negotiations without complete negative
peace. Russia does not have a strong enough reason to pull back its troops, since they technically
have never been recognized outright by any part of the Minsk Agreements. Russia is able to use
their troops as a spoiler to conflict resolution, since Ukraine cannot carry out elections without
the removal of Russian troops. Russia is content with waiting until a proposal that they fully
approve of comes their way. In many regards, this shows a failure of the leverage applied by the
West in their use of sanctions. Other scholars have argued that the moment when Minsk II was
signed was one moment when the conflict was ripe for resolution, but it is likely that his moment
is now gone and the poorly structured agreement may have frozen all future attempts at resolving
the conflict through the Trilateral Contact Group and Normandy Format.
Though Donbas is much safer than it was before Minsk II was signed, the conflict is far
from over. Breaches of the ceasefire continue to occur, and the fear that Ukraine feels while
holding on to the fragile Minsk II agreement demonstrates that there is the potential for more
violence.
Though the influence of previous negotiations on future ones in a conflict is undeniable,
whether those previous negotiations always present a positive impact should be challenged,
especially when the effects of such negotiations have been limited in creating negative peace.
Kyle Beardsley makes the recommendation that “outside actors should intervene more carefully
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when the disputants could benefit from using mediation for ends other than peace.”72 This
statement is meant to apply mainly to intrastate conflicts when non-state actors can gain the
legitimacy that they are seeking even without seeking peace, but this situation of the Donbas War
presents a new side to this problem. There are a number of reasons to argue that Russia has
gained from the mediation process and the Minsk Agreements in that it has not been required to
make any major concessions. These implications were not properly considered before the
formation of the Trilateral Contact Group or the Normandy Format, and mediation efforts in
Ukraine may have found themselves facing a new kind of “mediation dilemma.”
This paper hypothesizes that mediation efforts in Ukraine were doomed to failure ever
since the signing of Minsk II not due to power asymmetries between Ukraine and Russia or the
parties not reaching a mutually hurting stalemate, as argued by some past scholars, but instead
due to the weak leverage that the OSCE and other mediators have been able to apply towards
Russia and that their perceived bias towards Ukraine allowed for a situation where Ukraine has
agreed to a settlement not directly addressing Russian involvement in the war. These two
characteristics of the mediators have generated the third factor of the flawed Minsk Stalemate
which goes against the idea that mediation efforts build cumulatively towards success.
This paper would also like to present the ongoing war in Donbas as a potential area for
deeper research into mediation of gray zone conflicts. Though recent scholars have already
begun the shift towards condemning the Minsk Stalemate, far less have identified the larger
implications of this type of stalemate in other conflict scenarios to avoid similar failures in the
future.
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